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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense  
Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs  
Director, National Security Agency

FROM : John H. Stein  
Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : 1. Agenda for the Meeting of the National  
Defense Committee on 14 September  
2. Current Positions of the Political and  
Military Leadership Regarding the  
Introduction of Martial Law  
3. Comments on Exercise "ZAPAD-81"

1. Comment: The following information is from an extremely sensitive source and, therefore, recipients should hold this report very closely.]

2. A reliable source who has excellent access in the Polish Ministry of Defense reported that the following was to be on the agenda of the Extraordinary Session of the National Defense Committee, which met on 14 September 1981:

a. Report by Division General Czeslaw Kiszczak, Minister of Internal Affairs, on the subject of the state of security and the preparations of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to declare Martial Law.

b. A speech by General of Arms Florian Siwicki, Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, on proposals drafted by the Ministry of Defense regarding preparations for the introduction of Martial Law which were discussed at the meeting of the Military Council of the Ministry of National Defense on 13 September.

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c. A presentation by General of Arms Tadeusz Tuczapski, Vice Minister of Defense, regarding legal acts for declaring Martial Law. Within the political leadership rather substantial differences of opinion are developing on how to approach this problem.

3. Following is a summary of the current positions of the political and military leadership regarding the introduction of Martial Law:

a. Kania--Kania will not listen to any solutions which would require the use of force. According to General Siwicki, Kania stated: "At the 7th and 9th Party Plenums and at the Extraordinary Party Congress I gave my word, which I must keep." According to opinions at the Ministry of Internal Affairs and in the Polish General Staff, Kania is the main obstacle to a radical solution of the current political problem.

b. Jaruzelski--Jaruzelski, possibly under the influence of the Soviets and the conservatives of the Polish Party and Government but primarily in connection with the leadership of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, has changed his position and currently favors a more decisive solution to the problem. So far, he is not openly opposing Kania; however, the change in his position is apparent.

c. Olszowski--Olszowski stated to a close circle of friends that: "Now we have irrefutable proof that the events in Poland are directed from Brussels and possibly also from Washington through a Resident situated in one of the embassies in Warsaw." As evidence Olszowski cited the example of attempts of the committee for radio and TV matters to purchase television material on the Solidarnosc congress. Despite an earlier agreement by French television, and later American television, "somebody blocked the possibility for concluding the transaction."

d. Polish Ministry of Defense--While there is no unity of opinion within the leadership of the Polish General Staff, in general the leadership favors even more decisive action than was presented in Siwicki's report to the Extraordinary Session of the National Defense Committee. General Siwicki himself believes that Martial Law, even though already late in implementation, is inevitable and that the sooner it is declared, the better. General Siwicki, of all generals in the Ministry of Defense, continues to be the most loyal and

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devoted collaborator of Jaruzelski. A majority of the leading military cadre for various reasons has not only lost faith in Jaruzelski, but is beginning to ignore him. For example, Division General Tadeusz Krepski, Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Air Force, did not want to attend the meeting of the Extraordinary Session of the Military Council and made lame excuses for his absence. General Krepski is considered pro-Soviet. In addition, Admiral Ludwik Janczyszyn, Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Navy, asked to be excused from the same meeting because of graduation ceremonies at a military school. However, intensive preparations for the introduction of Martial Law are in progress in the Polish General Staff. A wartime command and control structure for the Ministry of National Defense has been worked out, and work places and means of communications are being prepared for directing operations during Martial Law. Certain directorates of the General Staff will be reinforced by officers from other institutions.

e. Ministry of Internal Affairs--Kiszczak, Minister of Internal Affairs, and General Boguslaw Stachura, Vice Minister of Internal Affairs, are pressing for an immediate and surprise declaration of Martial Law, mainly for the purpose of interning the Solidarnosc radicals. As of the 13th of September, the Ministry of Internal Affairs had formed three functional groups. These groups have been provided with photographs of their intended personnel targets as well as internment orders. A senior member of the Ministry of Internal Affairs told Source that: "There is a necessity for a night of long knives." In units of the citizens' Militia, small arms and "gas" [presumably riot control agents] weapons have been left at the disposal of Party activists.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs has infiltrated the leadership elements of Solidarnosc and has a good grasp of what their plans are. Currently, the infiltrators have alerted the Ministry of Internal Affairs about secret preparations for a surprise strike by the press, radio and TV. Allegedly the strike was to start on the 12th of September or early in the week of the 13th of September. The infiltrators are also bombarding the Polish leadership with information that Solidarnosc can tactically play down these conflicts in order to undertake a general encounter after the fall induction of military conscripts. By that time all [sic] of the active duty servicemen will be Solidarnosc members.

f. USSR--General of Arms Molczyk, Vice Minister of National Defense, who spent the entire time at the "ZAPAD-81"

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
maneuvers in the Soviet Union, stated that the Soviets treated the Polish delegation as if nothing was going on in Poland. Marshal Ustinov brought up the Polish situation only twice: Once, he stated that Poland is threatened by confrontation. However, at the time of the critique of "ZAPAD-81", he repeated Brezhnev's words at the CPSU Congress that "we will not leave Poland in need".

4. On the 12th of September Siwicki replaced Jaruzelski at the "ZAPAD-81" maneuvers. Siwicki returned to Poland the same evening and indicated that the maneuvers were of an extraordinary character in thrust and scope as well as in the employment of the most modern military materiel. Molczyk likewise indicated that he had never seen anything like it. The maneuvers included the use of SS-20 launchers; aircraft carriers with VTOL aircraft; large landing craft carrying 56 (?) tanks and floating means to lift those tanks ashore; new models of 152-mm howitzers; BMP-2's armed with 37-mm guns for engaging land and air targets; UAZ landing vehicles mounted with anti-tank weapons; and other modern armaments.

5. A new organization of an armored army was disclosed and employed as an operational maneuver group of the 1st Belorussian Front. The newest organization of an army corps was used as an operational maneuver group of the army of the 2nd Baltic Front. There was a demonstration of a two-sided battle exercise which consisted of two armored divisions in which over 600 T-72 tanks participated as well as hundreds of BMP-2 and other infantry transport vehicles. T-80 tanks were not shown in the exercise.


6. During "ZAPAD-81" there was a sea landing of an entire mechanized division as well as a demonstration by a regiment or brigade of marines. Also observed was a drop of an airborne division which operated on the axis of the operational maneuver group of the 1st Belorussian Front. There was also a new type of unit--an air assault brigade--which was dropped on the axis of the operation of an army corps which was used in the role of an operational maneuver group of the army.

7. During the critique of the "ZAPAD-81" maneuvers, Marshal Ustinov stated that: "The USSR will not allow itself to be passed by the imperialists."

  
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